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DOMESTIC LEGISLATION AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA CONFERENCE
Congressman Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.*
Mr. Chairman, I have been intrigued for many years over the
question: Is the cause of international peace advanced best by diplomats negotiating treaties or by commercial interests broadening
their commercial trade and investments in other countries?
A fair case can be made, I think, that commercial enterprises
do a better job than diplomats in bringing the nations of the world
closer together, and in lessening, or at least inhibiting the forces that
lead nations into warfare. When one nation's businesses have substantial investments in foreign countries, there certainly seems to
be a certain reluctance to bomb those countries back into the stone
age. The broadening of trade relationships, increased interdependency on materials and products, international monetary exchanges
and loan guarantees, airline landing rights, and steamship transportation rights - all commercial relationships - may often be
more helpful to world peace than the painful pace of diplomatic
negotiations amongst sovereign nations.
This question squarely underlies an issue now facing the United
States Congress: Should the Congress unilaterally enact a law encouraging United States industry, in partnership with foreign corporations, to mine the seabed? Or should Congress hold legislation
pending the conclusion of the current negotiations? Since unilateral
action by the United States may scuttle the current treaty negotiations, this question involves a major choice: Whether to maintain
the momentum of continuing United States leadership in deep
seabed mining technology development or to support the significant, but slow, progress we have made in negotiating a far-reaching
and historic new international law of the sea treaty.
The benefits of a treaty cannot be understated. In our own
history as a nation, disputes on the oceans have often led us into
war. Consider the following: Privateering against United States
shipping by Great Britain was a contributing cause of our Revolutionary War, and probably the major cause of the War of 1812. In
our Civil War, the naval blockade against the Confederacy - and
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European acceptance of that blockade - was probably the key
factor which prevented the South from permanently dividing the
nation. The sinking of the Maine in Havana Harbor in 1898 triggered the Spanish American War. The sinking of the Lusitania and
U-boat activity against United States ships was a material factor in
moving us towards involvement in World War I. More recently we
see cases like that of the Pueblo and the Mayaguez bringing us close
to confrontation. In the case of the Pueblo, for example, our 'Navy,
in its wisdom and with a certain propensity to test the will of foreign
nations, chose to deliberately send the Pueblo within the claimed
territorial sea of Korea - a claim which we did not recognize as
valid under international law. We should not forget how close we
Americans came to going to war rather than accept that seizure and
the later humiliation of the United States Navy crew. When the
Cambodians seized the Mayaguez, again in disputed waters, President Ford did commit marines to recover the crew. And finally,
there is the famous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 1 This fatal mistake
by Congress, which permitted us to later become involved in a major
and disasterous war without the Declaration of War required by the
Constitution, resulted from the Navy's decision to send two destroyers, the C. Turner Joy and the Maddox, within a 12-mile limit
claimed by North Vietnam, and within a few hours steaming distance of an ongoing amphibious operation by our allies, the South
Vietnamese.
So we have a great deal to gain from a treaty: Finalizing of
territorial seas at twelve miles; guarantees of free transit through
and over straits; agreement on firm definitions of the rights of all
countries within a 200-mile economic zone; and, perhaps most important, establishment of a system of dispute settlement for conflicts involving ocean issues. Establishment of these principles
would constitute a tremendous step towards reducing conflict and
tension on over two-thirds of the earth's surface.
On the other hand, should the Congress give up on the slow
pace of the Law of the Sea Conference negotiations, now stretching
into their sixth year?
Congressional impatience stems not only from the slow pace of
the negotiations but also from the recognition that after the successive unproductive negotiating sessions on the deep seabed portion
of the treaty, agreement on language acceptable to the United
1. Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
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States Senate is now regarded as unlikely, if not impossible, by most
Members of Congress who have followed the negotiations, as well as
by the White House. Unilateral legislative action that will permit
United States corporations to proceed with deep seabed mining,
therefore, is inevitable during this Congress. That this will have a
significant international impact, similar to the impact of the unilateral action of the United States in establishing a 200-mile zone for
fishing conservation, 2 is clear. But will legislative action in fact
destroy the substantial progress that the Law of the Sea Conference
has made to date? A good case can be made that it will. Delegates
to the Conference who would like to disrupt the proceedings could
use the United States action for that purpose.
It is regrettable that these unprecedented negotiations might
come to a halt at the eleventh hour. The people of the world share
a common interest in conserving and utilizing the resources of the
oceans, in protecting freedom of navigation, in protecting the marine environment from pollution, and in enhancing scientific knowledge of the oceans. Failure to achieve agreement can exacerbate the
same tensions and ambiguities which have so often led to conflict
in the past. Failure will also hurt those nations which can least
afford it, namely those which cannot defend their interests. Adoption of a new dispute-settlement mechanism covering two-thirds of
the world's surface could be the most significant step towards peace
in this century.
I personally have opposed unilateral action to date because of
my view that a new comprehensive international law of the sea is
far more valuable to the United States than is the early use of
United States technology to obtain a new source of nickel, cobalt,
and copper. I view the dispute settlement procedures in the treaty
alone as being of far greater ultimate worth to the people of the
United States than a guaranteed source of these particular metals.
After all, there are at least ten other essential metals (with an import dependence of greater than 80 percent) upon which we will
always require foreign developing countries for sources.
But my view is not the majority view of my colleagues in the
House and Senate. The clear majority view is that any Law of the
Sea Treaty negotiated by the United States must guarantee access
to the deep seabed for United States companies. Without clearly
guaranteed access for United States ~ompanies, there is simply no
2. Fishery Conservation Zone, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976).
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hope that the United States Senate will ever ratify a Law of the Sea
Treaty. That majority view of the House of Representatives, and I
believe the Senate as well, is probably fairly accurately set forth in
the following letter sent to President Carter on January 29, 1979, by
Chairman Murphy and Breaux of the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee and Oceanography Subcommittee, respectively:
..........
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January 29, 1979
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
We are compelled to raise a matter about which we are gravely
concerned. The United States delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea appears to be engaged in a
headlong rush to the conclusion of a comprehensive oceans treaty
which is inimical to critically important interests of the United
States. This effort is being undertaken without adequate consideration of Congressional opinion. Indeed, we are convinced that, unless
remedied, this defect in the process is likely to lead to the conclusion
of a treaty which will be signed by the United States, ratified by
more than 100 foreign States, but which will fail to obtain Senate
approval. We hardly need point out the international consequences.
A major, long-standing policy of the United States at the Law
of the Sea negotiations has been to achieve assured access by this
nation to the minerals of the international deep seabed. Those minerals include, among others, cobalt, manganese, and nickel, each of
which is essential to the production of high quality steel and specialized alloys for high technology items. Commercially attractive
quantities of copper are also on the deep seabed.
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss2/6
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It is clear that the United States and other western industrialized countries, whose economic and political interests are very different from those of the Third World and East Bloc, would be in a
distinct minority in the International Seabed Authority which
would supervise and control ocean mining under the treaty regime.
Consequently, until recently, the United States has sought to negotiate at the Law of the Sea Conference a detailed mining code
clearly setting forth reasonable conditions of access and carefully
circumscribing the rulemaking and discretionary powers of the Authority.
There is at present, however, a movement by the delegation to
consider a simplified treaty text. The theory is that the complexities
of the detailed approach are too great to permit the resolution of
major outstanding issues by the Conference in a viable time frame.
The developing countries are calling for an early end to these protracted negotiations. What is contemplated, therefore, on both sides
is a negotiation at the Conference of relatively undetailed treaty
provisions which would be fleshed out by an interim organization
prior to ratification.
The difficulty is that this approach would call upon the United
States to sign a treaty without knowing whether access to ocean
minerals would be assured; it would be, in essence, a blank check.
The argument that we would insist upon an interim organization
structured to protect our interests in developing rules and a permanent procedure which would not allow the rules to be undone against
our interests is unpersuasive. The Third World will not accept that
kind of situation. The long history of negotiations and the ideological nature of the Third World position make this abundantly
clear. At best, our ability to protect our interests would have to be
ambiguous to be widely acceptable among the developing countries.
Once signed by more than 150 nations, the treaty would change the
political and legal equation greatly. If the interim oranization failed
to produce assured access in the detailed regime, and the United
States failed to ratify, the cost would be far higher to this country
than if the treaty were not concluded in the first instance. Realizing
that, the Third World would apply greater pressure in the interim
organization to achieve its aims. Our ability to protect our interests
would be substantially diminished.
There are other grave problems, insofar as the delegation has
developed an unclassified, officially uncontrolled document reflecting not only the simplification approach, but also numerous substantive provisions highly prejudicial to United States interests.
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Mandatory transfer of technology as a practical condition of access;
a seabed mining production ceiling, which while time limited on its
face, would insure politically that the ceiling would be renegotiated
to become indefinite·; a national quota system for mine site allocation; a system of selection of applicants for mine sites badly tilted
toward joint ventures which would benefit the Third World and not
the United States; a moratorium on ocean mining of manganese
nodules twenty-five years after the treaty enters into force, which
while not legally automatic, would be politically inevitable precisely
at the time the national need for the minerals became acute; a
moratorium on all mining of non-manganese nodule minerals, pending adoption of a regime for them; and a system of governance for
the Authority which would fail to protect U.S. interests adequately.
In short, access would not be assured. Moreover, mandatory
transfer of technology and a production ceiling violate clear, longstanding United States policy on technology transfer and commodity arrangements. The results of these two features, alone, are bound
to be adverse in terms of technological innovation, inflation, national balance of payments, and jobs.
As a whole, the provisions in the delegation document would
deny the United States security of supply of vital seabed minerals
for the indefinite future. The delegation denies that the document
reflects a United States position, but the impression of foreign
States is to the contrary and delegation testimony on key issues
during Congressional hearings indicates that those States are correct.
The balance of the treaty offers the United States little if any,
advantage over customary law, so far as the continental shelf and
fisheries are concerned. The treaty regime for marine scientific research is highly restrictive. The navigation regime contains dangerous ambiguities which almost certainly would be interpreted to the
disadvantage of our maritime interests, notwithstanding the fact
that global commercial and military interests dictate relative freedom of movement on the seas. As far as the system of dispute
settlement under the treaty is concerned, it is so complex and
fraught with exceptions that it is likely to be of little practical value.
In short, the abandonment of deep ocean minerals cannot be justified on the basis of benefits to be derived from other elements of the
treaty.
Mr. President, we urge your personal intervention to assure
that the Congress is heard and its views properly taken into account
before the United States delegation places the nation in a seriously
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss2/6
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adverse position. Implementation of the Panama Canal treaties and
the ratification of SALT II already promise to place a severe strain
on the ability of the Congress to accommodate Administration foreign policy. We are convinced that a Law of the Sea treaty such as
that which the delegation is apparently prepared to accept-notwithstanding unconvincing caveats to the contrary-would be more
than the political traffic could bear.
Sincerely,
JOHN B. BREAUX
Chairman
Subcommittee on Oceanography
JOHN M. MURPHY
Chairman
Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries
I disagree with the letter, and particularly with its criticism of
the United States Delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference.
Again, I believe it is inevitable that an impatient Congress will pass
deep seabed mining legislation during this Congress. The question
then is, what should this historic and precedent-setting legislation
contain? Our experience with legislation of international impact has
taught us that clear and careful draftsmanship is rqui:red. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act 3 provides a good example.
Our self-serving exception regarding tuna has resulted in bad relations with many developing countries whose expanded economic
zones can be the source of productive tuna fishing. These countries
refuse to recognize our provincial position that we will not regulate
tuna fishing in our 200-mile zone (where tuna rarely go), and they
cannot regulate tuna fishing in their 200-mile zones (where tuna do
go). These countries have understandably excluded the United
States from recent negotiations to establish regional management
schemes.
In addition, it is clear that after the United States enacts a deep
seabed mining bill other countries of the world will use that bill as
a model and will enact similar legislation. This being so, our bill
should at a minimum include the following concepts:
3. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976)).
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(1) Recognition of the "common heritage of mankind" and the
anticipated conclusion of a fair treaty.
(2) Establishment of a revenue sharing fund for distribution to the
entire international community when a suitable treaty can be negotiated.
(3) Preservation of the concept of freedom of the seas.
(4) No appearance of an assertion of sovereignty over any portion
of the seabed.
(5) Comprehensive environmental protection, resource management, and safety.
(6) Acceptable provision for international tax and customs policy.
(7) Free location of processing plants.
(8) Free choice of construction and flag of mining, processing, and
transportation vessels.
(9) Antitrust review prior to license issuance.
(10) Reasonably precise definition of the terms, conditions, and
restrictions on licensing.

I believe that the language of H.R. 3350, reported out of this
Committee by unanimous voice vote in 1977,' can be easily
amended to reflect the recommendations I have offered above. I will
shortly introduce, for the Committee's consideration, a series of
amendments to H.R. 3350 which would accomplish these purposes.
4. H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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PANEL DISCUSSION
MR. HULL: Thank you very much Congressman McCloskey. We
will now receive questions from the panel.
PROF. GOLDIE: Congressman, I feel very supportive of your view
about a simplified treaty. However, there is one further problem
that could arise. Julius Stone, my former professor at the law school
in Sidney, Australia and also my professor at Harvard, has recently
published a book called Conflict Through Consensus. 1 I do remember it as one of the most sophisticated analyses of consensus politics
that I have ever read. The case study that this book emphasizes is
that of the definition of aggression. Stone pointed out that the final
G.A. resolution on the definition of aggression 2 is so broad that it
lets anybody interpret it more or less as they please. He is thereby
following his own philosophy about the mutability of words. But
there is more to it than that. There are compromises of opposites in
many of the key phrases. I think one concern that one should have
with regard to a more generalized format is that a consensus that
has led to these generalizations is simply a disguise for linguistic
gymnastics and for political warfare, which Julius also calls the
conflict situation. If agreement of opposites is achieved by general
phrasiology, then I think that such a convention as you have envisioned could not, because of its very nature, assure the freedom of
access to which I think there is American consensus on all sides.
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I am not sure I understand what you
said in your conclusion. What do you mean by "there is an American consensus on all sides?"
PROF. GOLDIE: I think that most Americans, whether they have
opposed or supported the deep seabed mining bill since the first one
was brought forward in 1972, would not argue that access to seabed
resources should be denied. That is, they would argue that there
should be freedom of access. The question has been one of modalities through a universal organ or an international organization. People who have opposed the bill have largely done so on the basis that
it will stultify the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the
Sea. 3 Or they oppose it for other reasons that are similar, such as
1. J. STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS (1977).
2. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 1 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. N9631 (1974).
3. The deep seabed mining bills proposed since 1972 are: H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977); S. 2085, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2053, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 11879,
94th Cong., 2nd Ses&. (1976); S. 713, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976); H.R. 12233, 93rd Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1974); H.R. 9, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1134, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
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environmental reasons. But it seems to me that offhand I do not
recall anybody who has said that the seas are inviolate and that no
one should have access to them, more or less on a basis of right
rather than a basis of concession.
CONGRESSMAN McCLOSKEY: You have fu~ther confused me. I had
thought that it was the American concensus, it certainly is not the
concensus of the Congress, that we have the right of access at this
point and that we have delayed it only because we anticipated,
within a reasonable period of time, an international regime could be
worked out. We now find that the nine years from 1970 to 1979 does
not constitute a reasonable period of time and that what is coming
out of the treaty text does not give guaranteed access.
PROF. GOLDIE: That is exactly what I was saying. What I was
really stressing, however, was not concern for right of a~cess as
such, taking that as a given, but rather the question of sufficient
clarity of draftsmanship. The conflict through consensus, to use a
shorthand phrase, is not inherent in the short form of a convention.
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: Mr. Congressman, I would like to note
that the letter which you quoted from has been answered by Secretary ·Vance on behalf of the President. Since Elliott wrote the answer, you will understand that it does not take too kindly to the
letter's characterization of the delegation and its irresponsible attitude. Rather, in summary, it accuses Congressman Murphy and
Breaux of distorting the facts in terms of what our positions have
been, what we are trying to do, and to some extent, the judgments
on the consequences of action. I would note that I think it is entirely
possible that those, who in the past, moved us into the channel of
negotiating endless detail did so in order to insure that we did not
end up with a treaty. I have felt that anybody with experience in
international law, the development of international law and negotiation of treaties who looks at the kinds of details that we have been
trying to include in the treaty over recent years, would have to say
that we are going against all tradition. We are failing to recognize
that international law is opposed to any of our national legal systems and is a very primative system. You cannot do the kinds of fine
tuning that those drafts have tried to do. Namely, fine tuning what
various international organs cannot do, what their interrelations
are, and where they can issue regulations and where they cannot.
The simplified text to which Congressmen Murphy and Breaux
H.R. 14918, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972); H.R. 13076, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972); S. 2801,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss2/6

10

McCloskey: Domestic Legislation

1978-79]

Domestic Legislation

235

take such exception in my judgment frightens them, and frightens
the mining industry, not because it falls short in terms of giving
assurances of access but rather because it is within the scope of what
we might in fact be able to negotiate. It looks like a real treaty. They
suddenly see it for the first time and they get worried that we might
in fact be about to conclude a treaty. And that is why they are
nervous about it. Actually I hope they are nervous on that ground
because I think they are going to have to reconsider the value of a
treaty as opposed to the value of an embittered and prolonged impass in the international society.
I would say that much of the detail which is in the present text
is probably necessary and non-controversial. But the text which
they criticize states clearly and in workable terms, things which are
unworkable and poorly stated in the text before the Conference. The
simplified text also recognizes the inevitability of negotiating many
more details to make, what we call, the rules and regulations of this
international authority. It proposes that this be done essentially
between the signature of the treaty and the entry into force of the
treaty. It has been my assumption, and Elliot's assumption, that we
cannot expect the Senate of the United States to give its approval
to the Law of the Sea Treaty unless it can see what it means in
detail. But this does not seem to us to be the same thing as saying
that all these terms have to be in the treaty. It may mean that we
have to work out rules and regulations before codification. But
under any practice of recent years, there is a period of years between
signature and entry into force of a treaty of this sort, and that time
can be utilized to work out the rules and regulations. I would suggest
that we would never have better leverage than in a situation where
it was clear that the Senate's willingness to give its advice and
consent to the treaty depended on these rules and regulations implementing the treaty in a responsible fashion which made mining
economical and possible. This would not be done in a politicized
conference of ambassadors to the United Nations but rather in a
continuous twelve-month a year working group from the various
mining democracies around the world. So, at any rate, it may be
harsh of me to suspect the motives of some of these people. I certainly do not know and would not want to say that Congressmen
Murphy and Breaux in fact do not want a treaty. But some of the
people who are pushing them and some of the people representing
the mining industry misguidedly do not want a treaty. And I think
that is mainly what is behind it.
MR. HULL: George, I would like to pick up on your point in order
Published by SURFACE, 1979
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to underscore the one that Congressman McCloskey made earlier.
If one has a generalized treaty which contains dispute settlement

provisions, the advancement of international law will be great and
the whole issue that we are dealing with will be pushed forward to
a point where, I think, we would all be very proud and feel very
secure. I want to state as a footnote what I have always found is both
a paradox and a potential parade of horribles. It relates back to the
earlier comment that was made about the hypothetical fishing vessels and the rule of the road that Fred referred to. We all assume
that without a treaty there will be seabed mining solely by the
United States and that we will be able to mine as we wish. In point
of fact, that may be the way it is now, but we must bear in mind
the history of the United States. If there is a challenge we are not
about to begin an undeclared war, that Pete referred to earlier. We
have the potential situation of the United States Congress passing
a deep seabed mining bill and everyone wanting to go out and mine
the deep seabed. We have at the same time the possibility that the
rest of the world will continue negotiating and come up with a
convention which says there can be no mining without the consent
of the international authority. We would then be left with a rather
difficult problem. However, it is one for which history provides a
very clear answer in terms of what the United States would do in
such a situation. Would we go ahead and mine, thus risking conflict
and setting in motion that undeclared state of war? Or would we
submit as was the case, for instance, in Ecuador? I pose this as a
footnote but if someone would like to respond to it that would be
fine with me.
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I think that the State Department
rather than the Congress ought to respond to that question. I did
not mean by my earlier comments to say that the State Department
was limited by what Congress might do. But the Defense Department will certainly be limited by what Congress does or does not
require for the protection of United States seabed mining claims or
operations.
MR. YouNG: I would like to make comment on George Aldrich's
remark from the point of view of industry of which I am not a
spokesman. He said there are those in the industry who do not want
a treaty. That may be so. But I would be inclined to say that the
more accurate statement would be that the industry, in general,
would prefer a treaty of a kind that would be acceptable to it. It does
not want what industry would call a bad treaty and there are things
about the draft which make it a bad treaty from that point of view.
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss2/6
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I did have one other question for Congressman McCloskey. Mr.
Herman, a little while ago, referred to the political repercussions
that might ensue on the international scene if national legislation
were to be adopted. Looking forward to congressional action on this
issue, do you think that anticipation of repercussions is likely to be
an influential factor on the congressional debate?
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I do not think so. Congress at one
time had a kind of bi-partisan support of an administration of either
party in matters of foreign policy. But ever since Ambassador Moynahan at the United Nations spoke out in condemnation of the
rhetoric that came from the Third World at the General Assembly,
and received the broad approval of the American public, it has been
politic for Members of Congress to not indicate a strong support of
the United Nations that as might cause them to be defeated by their
electorate. This is an unfortunate reality. There are two aspects of
this that should be understood fully by the public and by those with
whom we negotiate. First the attention of the American people
today is turned entirely inward upon inflation, taxes, and what they
perceive as over-regulation by government. Second, the regulation
that will be imposed by the new Deep Seabed Authority will be
perceived by many of my colleagues in the Congress as the same
type of over-regulation of business that occurs domestically, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission or the environmental regulations. We have seen with Proposition 13 in California4
a rise against over regulation. This will be a potent argument in the
Congress against accepting a treaty which appears to have a complex and hardly understandable regulation of the businesses which
conduct deep seabed mining.
A third point that ought to be clearly understood is that because of Vietnam, because of an arrogance of executive power, because of a feeling that we in the Congress unduly delegated our
power to declare war to the President, and because of our ability to
determine the truth from diplomats over a period of years, most of
my colleagues, including the two-thirds that have been elected in
the last six years, have run on the platform and strongly believe that
the Congress should be independent of the Executive Branch in
matters of foreign policy. In this principle they are strongly supported by their constituants. It has been only by fairly narrow margins that a President has been able to obtain ratification of the
4. CAL. CONST.

Published by SURFACE, 1979

art. 13A (West Supp. 1979).

13

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1979], Art. 6

238

Syr. J. Int'l. L. & Com.

[Vol. 6:225

Panama Canal Treaty, 5 been able to obtain congressional support
of the sanctions on Rhodesian chrome, 6 has been able to obtain
congressional support for the balanced sale of weapons to Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, as well as Israel. The Congress is skeptical as to
whether or not it supports the Executive Branch in the negotiation
of treaties which may or may not, be perceived by the American
people to be advantageous. This is no idle threat. The final paragraph of the Murphy-Breaux letter where they point out that SALT
II and the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty might be
about all the Congress can be expected to bear in going along with
the Executive Branch and that this kind of a deep seabed regime
would just be the final straw that broke the camel's back is not what
some of us might call an attempt at blackmail. I am not at all sure,
for example, that the Senate is prepared to ratify SALT II. Further,
it is going to be a very close question whether we pass legislation on
the Panama Canal treaties in the House. But this new relationship
between Congress and the Executive ought to be fully understood
by the negotiating parties at Geneva. We quite often find that foreign nations believe that what Congress is doing is essentially a
rubber stamp of the administration's effort. Thus, this MurphyBreaux letter may have been triggered, for example, by the administration in an attempt to use it as a bargaining tool in the negotiations by showing their fellow negotiators that they cannot negotiate
with them because Congress forbids it. But I can assure you that the
sentiments in the Breaux-Murphy letter with which I disagree are
the true sentiments of the Congress and could be reflected in a vote
which would overwhelm the best intentions of this administration
to negotiate a fair treaty.
I want to say that of all of the foreign policy actions conducted
by this administration, many of which appear to be in confusion, I
think that the effort they have made in the law of the sea negotiations demonstrates the best craftsmanship and the best correlation
of the always differing views of the many officers of the United
States Government, that it has made to date. Ambassador Richardson and Ambassador Aldrich have done a superb job in what they
are attempting to do. But what they are attempting to do may
plainly be impossible, and that is the concern that I have. I am
5. For the issues and controversies surrounding the ratification of the Panama Canal
Treaties, see Rugin, The Panama Canal Treaties: Keys to the Locks, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
159 (1978).
6. 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1976).
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afraid that this impossibility will reflect on the passage of this legislation.
MR. HERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat hesitant to get
involved in a discussion of the internal legislative processes of the
United States as I represent a foreign government. Consequently, I
would not want to comment on the specifics of proposals that were
before the Congress. I just think it is worth noting that while action
on the part of a national legislature with respect to seabed mining
can be justified in terms of the domestic law as a freedom of the high
seas, I think what I said before is worth bearing in mind. It is by no
means certain that, under conventional and customary international law, seabed mining is supportive as a freedom of the high
seas. Nor in my view is it certain that traditional concepts of res
nullius with respect to the seabed as opposed to the water column
admits of activity which purports to exercise some measure of exclusivity over an area or the resources. All that means is that the
reaction of the international community to legislation on the part
of one or another municipal legislature is hard to gauge. It is possible that the reaction would be manifested in a number of ways, all
political, before a variety of bodies, such as the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development which will be meeting in
May, 1979, in the United Nations General Assembly. There is also
the possibility of some attempt by the General Assembly to ultimately refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. That
does not mean that freedom of the high seas would not be vindicated
ultimately. But it strikes me that in the short term or the medium
term there are going to be a lot of uncertainties. And if the International Court of Justice is eventually seized of this matter, these
uncertainties could continue for some time. We have to ask ourselves what the result might be on the viability of the International
Court of Justice as an ultimate dispute settling body in the case of
an issue as contentious as this one. What happens to the respect of
that body if it decides an issue which is highly contentious and
which does not meet the major preoccupations of one or another
major State? I only hope that if the Congress is going to pass legislation in 1979, it almost did in 1978, that it is doing so because there
is a demonstrated legislative gap that is necessary to be filled to
meet the concerns of United States citizens.
Finally I think it is incumbent on me to point out that, while
suggestions have been made that present seabed provisions are terrible, concession to the treaty under these conditions would not
overcome its advantages. While it is difficult to analyze all the
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provisions of the law of the sea treaty or the treaty reflected in the
Informal Composit Negotiating Text (ICNT)7 with respect to every
nations expectations and interests, I think we have to recognize that
if nothing else, leaving aside the seabed provisions and Part XI of
the ICNT, we are very close to agreement on a number of other
provisions. Those provisions would define the limits of the territorial
sea, 8 would enshrine the right of virtually unfettered passage
through the territorial sea, 9 would fix limits to continental shelf
claims, 18 would provide for unimpeded transit through straits, 11
would allow submarines to transit international straits underwater,12 and would allow for overflight over those straits. 13 We do not
have that in conventional or customary international law but the
ICNT would provide it. It would do a range of things to avoid conflicts in fishery matters. I think it is a bit simplistic to suggest that
there are no advantages to be gained by the current provisions in
the ICNT in areas other than the seabed treaty and that conventional or customary international law will answer all the needs of
maritime states. I think that needs a hard and close look before such
a conclusion can be reached. I have some particular comments on
the House version of the bill but I will leave those and, if we have
time, I would like to get back to them. Thank you.
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say
that I agree completely with Mr. Herman's statement. I am also in
strong disagreement with the Murphy-Breaux letter which contends
that there are not valuable protections to the United States interests
in the provisions other than the deep seabed provision. I think that
the treaty in nearly every respect, except for the deep seabed question, does represent an advancement to the interests of the United
States. Perhaps the single exception is the scientific research provision. There I accept that it is inevitable that since we have claimed
fishery jurisdiction out to 200 miles, 14 other nations are going to
claim scientific research jurisdiction out to 200 miles. With that
exception, I think that you are absolutely correct and that the
7. 8 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (6th Sess.) 1, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.62/WP.10 (1977).
8. Id. at 6 (Part II, 2 of the Informal Composit Negotiating Text).
9. Id. at 7 (Part II, 3 of the Informal Composit Negotiating Text).
10. Id. at 16 (Part VI of the Informal Composit Negotiating Text).
11. Id. at 10 (Part III of the Informal Composit Negotiating Text).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Fishery Conservation Zone, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976).
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Murphy-Breaux position is wrong. But if we enact this legislation,
in my judgment it will not be because of a demonstrated need for
the deep seabed minerals. I agree with what Ambassador Aldrich
said earlier: That while there is a need in the future, there is no
immediate need for the passage of this legislation to get these minerals before the end of the century. If we pass the law, as I expect we
will, it will be because of impatience with two things: First, the slow
pace of negotiations and second, the perceived lack of leadership by
the President in this area, similar to his perceived lack of leadership
this year in other areas of foreign affairs. But the real reason that
we will enact this legislation will be due to the conviction of Congress. If after the May negotiations it appears that an ultimate
treaty will not be ratifiable by the Senate, then I would have a hard
time arguing that we should defer legislation of this kind because
of some possibility that the international community will rise in
armed rebellion.
MR. LEE: Mr. Chairman, in my presentation 15 I did not refer to
the developing countries' view regarding the question of assured
access. I think perhaps I should be allowed to make a supplementary statement.
In the last session, after the chairman of Negotiating Group I,
Ambassador Njenga from Kenya, presented what he referred to as
the compromise formula on Annex II relating to additions for exploration and exploitation of minerals in the deep seabed, 16 the Group
of Seventy-seven had a meeting. After three hours of debate, the
general view that emerged was that the text assured guaranteed
access to private firms and companies. This is their interpretation.
You have pointed out that the industries and the Congress find it
difficult after reading the complicated versions of the treaty to
clearly conclude whether or not there is assured access. I think this
illustrates a difficulty that is inherent in international legislation.
You cannot expect a piece of international legislation to be written
in clear terms. The reason for this is that it involves over 150 countries which present many different views and often have diametrically opposed interests and concerns. The provisions always give a
little in one place just to take it back somewhere else. The developing countries examine these provisions and draw one clear conclu15. Lee, Developing Countries and the Law of the Sea Conference, 6 SYR. J. INT'L L. &
CoM. 213.
16. 10 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (7th Sess.) 126, at 13743, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/RCNG/2.
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sion. Namely, that the treaty provides for assured access. We will
have to recognize this inherent difficulty in international legislation.
You also refer to the slow pace of negotiations. I think we all
recognize that this Conference is dealing with over 100 sub-items
and twenty-five major items, and it has taken us about ten years.
Perhaps from that point of view it appears to be a long process. But
if we look at our daily life, there are so many decisions which cannot
be made in a very short time. When we are negotiating with 150
different states, with such complex and complicated issues, perhaps
the process is not that unduly long. ·what I think we have to recognize is that the solutions we are contemplating will be reasonable
and will achieve the objectives we intend to obtain. Thank you.
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I have to concede that the Congress
is often guilty of writing ambiguous legislation with some deliberation which takes the courts years to resolve. We sometimes try to
cure that by including a legislative history which is clear in terms
of the debates that this language means a certain thing. I think we
could probably have a treaty tomorrow if the Group of Seventyseven issued a clear statement that they interpret the language of
this agreement to allow United States companies, each of which
offers reasonable opportunity for consortia partnership participation to any company in the Third World, to have the right to proceed with deep seabed mining by the year 1986. If that kind of a
clear statement were made interpreting this language, ambiguous
though it may be, so that a court would have clear guidance, I think
that would probably end the danger of United States legislation this
year. If Mr. Lee's optimism is correct and the leader of the Group
of Seventy-seven can issue such a statement, perhaps we will have
a treaty. I would be interested in Ambassador Aldrich's comments
on that.
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: Well, I would like to reinforce the optimistic side of your nature, Congressman, because your pessimism
is all too well counted on past experience. I do think that inevitably
in treaties, even with the best of goodwill and in fact without great
differences of meaning behind them, the text often does not say as
clearly as we would like what we intend it to say. This is true, in
part, because you have to negotiate the treaty in so many different
languages and they do not all fit together. But as important as any
other single thing we can do in the Law of the Sea Conference, I
think we should obtain agreement on rewriting a number of provisions in ways that make their meanings clearer. I think the procedure by which the law of the sea draft treaty was put together, with
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various individual committee chairmen doing their own drafting,
was almost guaranteed to create a text that does not hold together
as a whole, has internal inconsistancies beyond the norm, and will
create unnecessary problems if allowed to go forward that way. But
I think we will find that if we can solve most of the substantive
issues then there will be the desire in the Conference to produce a
much better text for signature than the one we see today.
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: In that connection, might I ask if
there is any consensus in the Conference of establishing a draftsmanship committee which might be delegated to cleanup and clarify the language of the present text. This was the procedure used for
the United States Constitution in order to place it in a condition
which finally led to its ratification by nine states. If a draftsmanship
committee could be agreed upon by the Conference at this spring
meeting to clarify the treaty text so that the Senate of the United
States could perceive that the guaranteed access was, as Mr. Lee
suggested, indeed the intention of the Group of Seventy-seven, I
would think that we could reach a treaty. Is there any hope of a
draftsmanship committee procedurally accomplishing that essential result?
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: I think there is considerable hope of that.
It comes in really several stages. First, improvements can be made
by the various negotiating groups themselves which are in the process of revising parts of this language. I know that the chairman of
the first negotiating group, for example, has already told us that he
plans to point out at the outset of the aid session that Annex II needs
to be rewritten in a clearer form. Then when the discussion is finished, he intends to produce a revised text that will be clearer. The
second stage involves the drafting committee. Fortunately we do
have a drafting committee in the Conference and it is chaired by the
most able representative of Canada, Allen Beaslly. They have not
had enough to do and it is about time we put them to work.
MR. HERMAN: George, I agree with you wholeheartedly on that
last point. One of the problems at the Conference is that the texts
which are produced have, in some respects, little chance of being
altered by the drafting committee. This is because the texts are
essentially the product of political process and while we have not
tested the scope of the mandate of the drafting committee, it could
be fairly restricted under the present process of negotiations.
I think this afternoon, if we get the opportunity, we should
come back to the simplification exercise because I personally believe
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that is the key to the future of the Conference. I know that there
are participants here that also have views on that score.
MR. HULL: Thank you very much.
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